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Some time after the publication of his book The Principles of Psychology in 1855, 
Herbert Spencer wrote to Alfred Tennyson: 
 SIR, 
  I happened recently to be re-reading your Poem “The Two Voices,” and 
coming to the verse 
 
  Or if thro’ lower lives I came- 
  Tho’ all experience past became 
  Consolidate in mind and frame- 
 
it occurred to me that you might like to glance through a book which applies to the 
elucidation of mental science, the hypothesis to which you refer. I therefore beg your 
acceptance of Psychology which I send by this post. 
      With much sympathy yours, 
      HERBERT SPENCER2 
 
Spencer’s motives for sending this letter, and a copy of his book, to Tennyson are 
unclear; perhaps he simply wanted to borrow a little of Tennyson’s cultural prestige by 
associating his work with that of the Poet Laureate. But it is significant that one of the 
most influential psychologists of the Victorian period should perceive a connection 
between his theories and a poem that was written two decades before the publication of 
those theories. His letter indicates that the investigations of the mind in Tennyson’s early 
work continued to resonate with readers throughout the nineteenth century, and that 
Tennyson’s poetry could be read by his contemporaries as making a contribution to the 
study of the mind. 
 Having said this, it is important to keep in mind the differences between 
Spencer’s theories and the conception of “mind and frame” that Tennyson puts forward 
in “The Two Voices”. In his desire to appropriate the poem to his cause, Spencer gives a 
selective reading of Tennyson’s lines. The triplet that he quotes forms part of a passage 
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in which the speaker of “The Two Voices” attempts to fight off his suicidal misery by 
arguing that his existence transcends his earthly life, that he is an “old soul in organs 
new” (l.393).3 The predominant focus of this passage is on the progress of the soul 
rather than on any sort of physical development. The Principles of Psychology, 
conversely, is a rigorously materialist account of psychology, presenting the mind as the 
product of physical evolution. Spencer claims that thought and behaviour are 
“determined by those psychical connections which experience has generated- either in 
the life of the individual, or in that general antecedent life whose accumulated results are 
organized in his constitution.”4 These different emphases may explain why the 
“sympathy” that Spencer expresses in his letter to Tennyson does not seem to have 
been reciprocated. There is no evidence that the poet ever replied to the letter, and his 
copy of The Principles of Psychology, now at the Tennyson Research Centre in Lincoln, 
is not exactly well-thumbed: apart from those of the first section, all of its pages remain 
uncut. It appears that although Tennyson started to read the book, he did not get very far 
with it. 
It is hardly surprising that Tennyson, a writer whose approach to human nature 
was based on questioning and doubting, should find Spencer’s sweeping systemisation 
of the development of the mind unsatisfactory. Yet there are genuine affinities between 
“The Two Voices” and the account of the mind presented in The Principles of 
Psychology. The language of the lines quoted by Spencer pulls against the seemingly 
metaphysical stance of the passage as a whole: the concluding emphasis on the word 
‘frame’ highlights the physical dimension of the speaker’s hypothetical progress, and the 
empiricist reference to “experience” implies that development, both psychological and 
physiological, is directed by interaction with the sublunary world. The phrase “lower 
lives” suggests the continuing influence of the evolutionary theories in which Tennyson 
was interested as an undergraduate in the late 1820s. Hallam Tennyson comments that, 
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while at Cambridge, his father held the opinion that the “‘development of the human 
body might possibly be traced from the radiated, vermicular, molluscous and vertebrate 
organisms’” (Hallam Tennyson, 1: 44). In “The Two Voices”, the speaker’s claim that he 
has not always existed “in human mould” (l.342) implies the existence of a preceding 
physical “mould” rather than an immaterial soul, and his collocation of “mind and frame” 
suggests that human psychology is, as much as the human body, an offshoot of “lower 
lives”. Admittedly, the speaker’s argument, a last-ditch effort to resist despair, never 
becomes clear or coherent. He describes it as “‘a random arrow from the brain’” (l.345), 
a phrase that articulates both Tennyson’s awareness of the ambiguity inherent in any 
attempt to understand the mind and his conviction that mental processes are 
inescapably tied to the physical body. 
“The Two Voices” epitomises Tennyson’s approach to psychology in his early 
poetry: while the poem gestures towards belief in an immortal spiritual element of 
identity, its attention persistently drifts back to an embodied mind that is shaped by 
physiology and by empirical experience. As a dialogue between the depressed speaker 
and an insidious internal voice that urges suicide, “The Two Voices” literalises 
Tennyson’s view, implicit throughout much of his early work, of the embodied mind as a 
divided and mutable compound of mental states whose operations defy conscious 
control. Personal experience must have played its part in forming this opinion of the 
mind. The psychological problems that had dogged Tennyson’s father, and that had 
been inherited to a greater or lesser extent by the poet and his ten siblings, would have 
been playing on Tennyson’s mind during the composition of “The Two Voices”; in early 
1833, around the time he began writing the poem, his brother Edward was admitted to 
an asylum for the insane, where he would remain for the rest of his life.5 
Tennyson’s approach to the mind in his poetry of the 1830s was shaped by wider 
cultural and intellectual trends as well as by personal circumstances. This was a decade 
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in which British writers on the mind, responding in part to the popularity of phrenology, 
began to place more emphasis on the role of the brain and the body in mental life and on 
the composite nature of the mind; a trend that would lead to the development of more 
formalised theories of physiological psychology from the 1850s onwards.6 The 
similarities between Tennyson’s account of the mind and the later theories of 
physiological psychologists such as Spencer are partly attributable to the fact that, 
through the books in his father’s library, the young Tennyson had access to many fields 
of enquiry (such as physiology, empiricist philosophy, and associationist psychology) 
that were subsequently influential in the development of theories of embodied 
psychology in the second half of the nineteenth century.7 
During the 1830s, debates within British culture about the body’s role in 
psychology focused largely on the question of insanity. Tennyson would become more 
closely involved with these debates at the end of the decade through his disastrous 
friendship with the asylum owner and theorist of madness Matthew Allen. As a younger 
man, the poet would have read about contemporary developments in the study of the 
mind and of insanity in particular in the numerous issues of the Quarterly Review that his 
father collected before his death in 1831. In a review of a book about “nervous 
affections”, published in the Quarterly in 1822, the doctor (and friend of Southey and 
Coleridge) Robert Gooch analyses mental pathology using language suggestively similar 
to that of Tennyson’s accounts of the fragility of the embodied mind: 
In this state, the ideas are moved, one minute by the will, the next by something 
else; one minute we can command them, another we feel them slip out of our 
grasp, and whirl across the mind with indescribable fleetness, guided, or rather 
hurried on, by some impulse strange to and stronger than ourselves. Insanity is a 
state in which the operations of the mind cease to be governed by intellectual 
laws, and become subservient to bodily impulses. 
 
For Gooch, while the uncontrollable “impulse” that defies the will appears to exist outside 
of “ourselves”, its origins actually lie in internal physiological processes. He argues that 
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the mental state that he describes offers “an experimental demonstration of the double 
nature of our being, of the physical and moral impulses of our thoughts, which are here 
brought into contact and comparison.”8 A similar sense of the mind’s “double nature” is 
played out in the conceptual contest between the body and the soul in “The Two Voices” 
and in the poem’s dialogic form. 
 Like most writers on insanity in the first half of the nineteenth century, Gooch 
diagnoses the body’s influence on the mind as pathological. However, the frequency 
with which Tennyson returns to the embodied mind in his early poetry suggests that, 
although he was not always happy about it, he saw the influence of the body as a more 
fundamental element of psychology. His handling of the irrepressibly nihilistic voice in 
“The Two Voices” goes further than Gooch’s account of the difficulty of controlling 
certain thoughts to suggest that mental processes might be inherently chaotic and 
unruly. Nevertheless, the presence of articles such as Gooch’s in an established 
publication like the Quarterly shows that ideas about the mind’s multiplicity, and its 
relationship to the body, were prominent within the intellectual culture in which Tennyson 
grew up. 
The poet also encountered these ideas through another, particularly influential 
source: Arthur Hallam. In the papers that he delivered to meetings of the Cambridge 
Apostles, and in his other writings, Hallam is both fascinated and distressed by the 
unstable materiality of the mind, and a similar appalled fascination is evident in the 
poems that Tennyson wrote around the time of Hallam’s death in September 1833. In 
“The Two Voices” and in the dramatic monologues “St Simeon Stylites”, “Tithon”, and 
“Ulysses” Tennyson explores the implications of Hallam’s approach to psychology. 
These poems all suggest that the mind, rooted in a fragile physiology and determined by 
empirical conditions, is both divided and changing, a collection of processes rather than 
a cohesive entity. This conception of the mind is traceable in many earlier poems, most 
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notably the quasi-dramatic monologue “Supposed Confessions of a Second-Rate 
Sensitive Mind Not in Unity with Itself” published in 1830, but it becomes central to 
Tennyson’s art in the poems that he composed in 1833. While Tennyson started writing 
“The Two Voices” and “St Simeon Stylites” before Hallam’s death, it is easy to picture 
him thinking over Hallam’s theories as he continued working on the poems after the 
event, and it is equally easy to imagine his grief sharpening his sense of the 
impermanence of both the body and the mind. 
In his essay “On Sympathy”, written in 1830, Hallam argues that personal identity 
is inherently mutable: “It is an ultimate fact of consciousness, that the soul exists as one 
subject in various successive states.” While this statement seems to cast doubt on the 
notion of a unified self, Hallam is quick to assert that the metaphysical soul provides an 
underlying “unity of subject” that preserves the ultimate cohesion of identity.9 The source 
of Hallam’s interest in the “successive” nature of consciousness is revealed in a letter 
that he wrote to Tennyson just months before he read “On Sympathy” to a meeting of 
the Apostles. Here he tells Tennyson what he is reading when not studying with his 
father: “I take occasional plunges into David Hartley… for my own gratification.”10 In the 
associationist model of psychology put forward in his Observations on Man, first 
published in 1749, Hartley argues that the mind functions by combining into sequences 
transient ideas that have their origin in “infinitely divisible” physical sensations. These 
sensations are conveyed to the brain through “vibrations” in the body’s nervous tissue, 
and Hartley concludes from this that ideas, the mind’s responses to sensations, must 
also be neurological in nature: 
Since therefore sensations are conveyed to the mind, by the efficiency of 
corporeal causes upon the medullary substance, as is acknowledged by all 
physiologists and physicians, it seems to me, that the power of generating ideas, 
and raising them by association, must also arise from corporeal causes.11 
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Hallam took up the physiological focus of Hartley’s account as well as its associationism. 
In his “Essay on the Philosophical Writings of Cicero”, written a year after “On 
Sympathy”, he argues that “the analysis of mind” undertaken by “inductive philosophers” 
(such as Hartley, presumably) has refuted the notion that the essence of mind is “simple 
and ultimate”, and has demonstrated “the dependent, composite, and divisible character 
of the only thinking and feeling substance”.12 
 Although Hallam espouses a belief in the “unity” of the soul in “On Sympathy”, 
the idea that the mind, dependent on a composite and divisible substance, might itself 
be composite and divisible also features prominently in the essay. Hallam acknowledges 
the unsettling implications for personal identity that are inherent in his description of the 
mind’s mutability: 
To know a thing as past, and to know it as similar to something present, is a 
source of mingled emotions. There is pleasure, in so far as it is a revelation of 
self; but there is pain, in so far that it is a divided self, a being at once our own 
and not our own, a portion cut away from what we feel, nevertheless, to be single 
and indivisible. (Hallam, “On Sympathy”, p.138) 
 
The metaphysical soul is the ostensible subject of this essay, but Hallam’s description of 
the mental process of memory foregrounds the fragmentation of identity that takes place 
within the empirical mind. The act of remembering highlights the fact that the past self 
and the present self are distinct; while we may “feel” that the self is “single and 
indivisible”, close attention to the operations of the mind reveals that the mental states 
that make up our identity are in fact, to use Hartley’s phrase, “infinitely divisible”. 
 The psychological division across time that Hallam describes in “On Sympathy” 
becomes a synchronous division in “The Two Voices”; the composite nature of the 
embodied mind engenders the poem’s psychological duality and denies the speaker 
control over his mental processes. Early on, he attempts to silence the sceptical voice by 
invoking the gift that “‘Nature’” has bestowed on “‘man’” (ll.17-18): 
 “She gave him mind, the lordliest 
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 Proportion, and, above the rest, 
 Dominion in the head and breast.” (ll.19-21) 
 
The confidence with which these lines present “mind” as humanity’s crowning glory, 
accompanied by a sovereign will that guarantees “dominion” over the physical domains 
of thought and feeling, is only surface-deep. It is undermined by the dialogic structure of 
the poem, and also, more immediately, by the form of this particular stanza. The 
monotony of the triple rhyme imparts a strained and unconvincing insistence to the lines, 
and the assertion of “dominion” is disrupted by the under-stressed metre. The iambic 
progress of the first line falters on its weak final syllable, and the awkwardness of 
stressing “and” in the second line and “in” in the third creates a tentative and stuttering 
metre that is an unpropitious vehicle for the stanza’s declamatory language. 
Furthermore, the phrase “head and breast”, with its explicit division of the self 
and its allusion to psychology’s ties to the body, upsets any conception of the mind as an 
integrated and autonomous unit. A manuscript version of this stanza locates man’s 
dominion in the “heart and breast”; the use of “head” in the published version both 
intensifies the stanza’s psychological focus and heightens its sense of internal division.13 
“Proportion”, too, is an unsettling word; it seems to suggest that the mind is not an entity 
in itself but a relation between other entities, perhaps the head and breast. The online 
OED, however, quotes this line as an example of “proportion” meaning “Form, shape; 
configuration (of the limbs of the body, etc.); a likeness, a figure.” Either sense of the 
word complicates the stanza’s assertions, implying that the mind is in some way a 
composite or material phenomenon. Tennyson often suggests that there is something 
lordly about the mind’s powers, but these powers are, for him, neither reliable nor 
controllable, because they originate in a psychology that is inherently contingent and 
fragmented. 
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 Throughout “The Two Voices” it is the voice that overtly presses the claims of the 
embodied mind, insisting that the speaker’s identity is shaped by and will end with his 
physical existence. The voice connects the speaker’s psychological disturbance to 
physical illness by claiming that he lacks “‘a healthy frame, a quiet mind’” (l.99). Although 
the speaker himself collocates the mind with the frame later in the poem, he persistently 
strives to affirm his faith in the existence of an immortal and immaterial soul. But, as in 
the “dominion” stanza, his language undermines his arguments by drawing attention to 
the fragility of the embodied mind. At one point he attempts to refute the idea, central to 
associationist and empiricist theories, that human psychology is defined by experience, 
denying that the mind of man is dependent on the “‘simple senses’” (l.277) and asking 
the voice: 
“Who forged that other influence, 
That heat of inward evidence, 
By which he doubts against the sense?” (ll.283-5) 
 
Christopher Ricks interprets the language of this stanza as an “invitation to scepticism”, 
arguing that “in a discussion of falsity the word ‘forged’ is so maladroit as to invite the 
suspicion of some unconscious adroitness deep in Tennyson.”14 Perhaps this adroitness 
was not unconscious; perhaps the ambiguity that pervades the speaker’s language 
represents a deliberate disruption of his argument on Tennyson’s part. As well as the 
use of “forged”, there is the revealing fact that the “heat of inward evidence”, itself a 
curiously empiricist description of what is presumably meant to be a priori knowledge, 
does not produce any assurance but rather another form of doubt. In some of his late 
poems Tennyson uses this doubt to resist what he sees as reductive materialist 
accounts of the universe and to reaffirm his belief in the divine, but it is presented here 
with far less rhetorical confidence. The implication of this stanza seems to be that, while 
the senses cannot be trusted, choosing to rely instead on any sort of “inward evidence” 
will only exacerbate psychological confusion. 
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The speaker’s metaphysical claims falter like this throughout the poem, and 
nowhere more than in the passage (ll.346-84) which he describes as “a random arrow 
from the brain” and in which his arguments for the existence of a transcendent and 
unchanging soul end up, persistently and perversely, highlighting the fragmented and 
mutable nature of the mind. Suggesting that he may have no memory of the past 
existence of his soul, the speaker compares himself to “‘men’” who “‘from cells of 
madness unconfined, / Oft lose whole years of darker mind’” (ll.370-2). This comparison 
of spiritual existence to a forgotten madness is bathetic more than anything else; it does 
little to support the speaker’s argument for the immortality of his soul, but it does draw 
attention to the weakness of the earthly mind that can succumb both to derangement 
and to memory loss. A few lines earlier the speaker uses another problematic simile to 
suggest that his soul’s past might be hidden from his consciousness: 
 “As here we find in trances, men 
 Forget the dreams that happen then, 
 Until they fall in trance again.” (ll.352-4) 
 
While these references to “madness”, “trances”, and “dreams” purport to affirm the 
immortality of the soul, their effect is to relegate the soul to the poem’s background, as 
the metaphysical psychology that the speaker claims to advocate is undermined by his 
focus on the transience and unreliability of mental processes. 
 By using the phenomenon of “trance” as evidence for the metaphysical 
permanence of identity with such ambiguous results, Tennyson is almost certainly 
responding to Coleridge; as Peter Allen has noted, Coleridge’s writings were a crucial 
intellectual influence on the Cambridge Apostles of Tennyson’s generation.15 In the 
Biographia Literaria Coleridge recounts the story of an uneducated German woman who 
spoke fluent Latin and Greek when she fell into periodic trances, and uses the narrative 
as supporting evidence for his critique of Hartleyan associationism and its account of the 
mind as a succession of transient mental states. He traces the origins of the woman’s 
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condition to her unconscious memories of her childhood, and concludes that the case 
shows “that all thoughts are in themselves imperishable” and that hence personal 
identity is equally imperishable.16 The speaker of “The Two Voices” is trying to follow the 
same line of argument, looking to the intermittent but enduring memories of “trance” for 
proof of the unity of identity that Coleridge, and Hallam in “On Sympathy”, locate in the 
metaphysical soul. But Tennyson’s poem, like Hallam’s essay, is ultimately closer to the 
associationist model of psychology that the Coleridge of the Biographia Literaria finds so 
objectionable. The language of “The Two Voices” evokes the fragmented mind far more 
forcefully than it does the cohesive soul, just as the poem’s dialogic form precludes 
psychological integrity and makes the fragmentation of the mind its structuring principle 
and its central concern. 
 The differing responses of these authors to the same mental phenomenon reflect 
a wider shift in literary approaches to the mind that took place in the early decades of the 
nineteenth century. In his study of Victorian poetry’s relationship to “mental science”, 
Ekbert Faas argues that, while both Romantic and Victorian poets were interested in 
delineating mental processes, for the Victorians these processes “ceased to be means 
to the end of higher metaphysical insights. Stripped of such philosophical pretensions, 
they are dealt with in more strictly psychological terms.”17 This is broadly accurate: 
Victorian poets unquestionably shy away from the boldly metaphysical assertions of the 
mind’s transcendent potential that were sometimes voiced by their Romantic precursors. 
However, the distinction is not absolute, certainly not in the case of Tennyson. Often in 
his poetry, and most famously in section XCV of In Memoriam, the contemplation of 
mental processes prepares the grounds for moments of metaphysical insight, but these 
moments are always problematic for Tennyson, ambiguous and circumscribed by the 
mind’s embodied status. Faas also neglects to mention that, as Alan Richardson has 
convincingly argued, poets such as Keats and the younger Wordsworth and Coleridge 
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were profoundly interested in empiricist and somatic approaches to the mind, and that 
there is “an antidualistic, materialist register within Romantic writing” that pushes against 
its “idealistic and transcendental conceptions of mind”.18 The multivalent accounts of the 
mind put forward by Romantic poets would have been some of the most important 
influences on Tennyson’s approach to psychology. 
 In this instance, however, the “trance” stanza and the overall structure of “The 
Two Voices” have less in common with Coleridge’s account of the mind in the 
Biographia Literaria than with later Victorian theories of “double consciousness”. Starting 
with the work of the doctor Henry Holland, double consciousness became, in the 1840s, 
a vogue term for classifying psychological conditions, such as trances, that appeared to 
split the mind between separate mental states. Its growing prominence was linked to 
advances in the study of neurology and anatomy that led to greater knowledge of the 
hemispheric structure of the brain. Holland defined double consciousness as a condition 
in which 
the mind passes by alternation from one state to another, each having the 
perception of external impressions and appropriate trains of thought, but not 
linked together by the ordinary gradations, or by mutual memory.19 
 
The closeness of this definition to the lines from “The Two Voices”, which were 
composed before the first publication of Holland’s Medical Notes and Reflections in 
1839, is most evident in the emphasis that both place on the separation of the two states 
of consciousness through the fragmentation of memory. 
Holland’s conception of double consciousness did not interfere with his belief in 
the ultimate unity of the mind. For him, the condition was caused by a pathological 
failure of the two cerebral hemispheres to work together, by the “incongruous action of 
this double structure, to which perfect unity of action belongs in the healthy state” 
(Holland, p.172). However, the psychologist Arthur Ladbroke Wigan, writing in 1844, 
took the argument further, claiming that the two cerebral hemispheres were two separate 
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organs, each one the site of a separate mind. In a healthy psychology, according to 
Wigan, one of these minds predominates over the other, but he identifies in mental 
pathology a “double process” of thought which “takes the form of a colloquy between the 
diseased mind and the healthy one”, a formulation that irresistibly calls to mind the 
dialogue of “The Two Voices”.20 Few writers went as far as Wigan in arguing for the 
duality of the mind, but the idea that there was a certain level of division inherent in 
human psychology, and that this division was somehow tied to the structure of the brain, 
became more widely accepted as the century progressed. “Double consciousness” took 
on a more wide-ranging role as a term that could denote any sort of mental division or 
conflict between incompatible trains of thought. By conveying its speaker’s misery 
through an internal dialogue “The Two Voices” presents an account of a divided 
psychology that closely anticipates later Victorian models of the duality of the mind and 
the brain. 
By turning psychological division into a literal dialogue the poem also pre-empts, 
by some twenty years, Matthew Arnold’s disapproving analysis of modern poetry’s 
preoccupation with “the dialogue of the mind with itself”.21 The voice mockingly tells the 
speaker: “‘Sick art thou- a divided will’” (l.106). This division, and the lack of control over 
the mind that it engenders, is embodied in the form of the poem and in the structure of 
this particular line, as one aspect of the mind addresses another using the second-
person pronoun, literally breaking the mind up into separate subjectivities. However, the 
voice is being disingenuous when it labels the divided speaker “sick”. “The Two Voices” 
ostensibly charts the speaker’s progress from pathological duality to stable mental unity, 
as his reconnection with the social institutions of church and family ultimately allows him 
to proclaim that “The dull and bitter voice was gone” (l.426). Yet after silencing this voice 
he immediately begins conversing with another internal voice, albeit a more positive one. 
The title of the poem describes a binary, but the fragmentation of the mind goes beyond 
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this: there are three voices in “The Two Voices”, and the poem presents a mind that, 
even as it changes, remains permanently and essentially divided. 
In many ways “The Two Voices” exemplifies what Isobel Armstrong describes as 
the Victorian “double poem”, the poem as the site of “endless struggle and contention”.22 
This poem’s duality is written into the formal dialogue between its voices, into the contest 
between spiritual and embodied accounts of the mind that runs through it, and into an 
ending that appears to enact psychological integration while simultaneously reaffirming 
mental division. Moreover, “The Two Voices” shows that Tennyson’s characteristic 
poetic ambivalence is inescapably bound up with his sense of the divisions within 
individual identity; the psychological dialogue that Arnold deemed morbid and enervating 
is presented in this poem as a fundamental feature of the mind. 
The dialogue of “The Two Voices” is perhaps an excessively literal delineation of 
the divided mind, but Tennyson refined his representation of psychology in other poems 
that he wrote in 1833. His approach to psychology arguably finds its best expression in 
the segmented and self-questioning structure of In Memoriam, which he started writing 
at this time, but it would take him another 17 years to fashion the poem that would 
present his most sustained examination of the mind into its final form. In the meantime 
he used some of the earliest Victorian dramatic monologues to address the same 
subject in a more condensed format. Herbert F. Tucker has identified Tennyson’s 
handling of the dramatic monologue as a development of the dialogic form of “The Two 
Voices”; he comments that, after working on this unresolved psychological dialogue, 
Tennyson proceeds to “give lyric voice to speakers who are dipsychic if not polypsychic, 
whose monologues form tense, split, shot-silk texts that are anything but monological.”23 
The monologues that Tennyson wrote in 1833 reaffirm his debt to contemporary models 
of the embodied mind and to Hallam’s reading of Hartleyan associationism in particular. 
“St Simeon Stylites”, “Tithon”, and “Ulysses” all present themselves as the products of 
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composite minds that are being transformed by the empirical conditions that press on 
them. In each of these monologues the speaker, like the speaker of “The Two Voices”, 
reveals, often against his stated will, that his mind is inescapably bounded by his bodily 
existence. 
The speaker of “St Simeon Stylites” tries to locate his identity in a metaphysical 
soul and to separate this soul from the body. When he labels his body “this home / Of 
sin, my flesh, which I despise and hate” (ll.56-7), his attribution of sin to the flesh is 
meant to highlight by comparison the purity of his saintly spirit. His statement also 
separates the body from the mind by occluding the very existence of sins of the mind, 
but it is precisely this psychological type of sin (pride, self-obsession, and the rest) of 
which the reader finds Simeon guilty. Despite Simeon’s protestations, the poem 
connects the mind to the body through his own words, which suggest that his 
psychological condition has been shaped by his physical circumstances: he calls himself 
“I, Simeon, whose brain the sunshine bakes” (l.161). The almost grotesque physicality of 
this statement irresistibly draws attention to the way in which Simeon’s body influences 
his mind. The state of his brain affects his mental state, and the physical deprivations to 
which he has subjected himself inevitably contribute to the psychological confusion that 
becomes apparent over the course of the poem. 
Like Hallam in “On Sympathy”, Simeon feels that the processes of memory have 
alienated him from his past self, but Tennyson’s monologist goes further than Hallam by 
casting doubt on the trustworthiness of those processes: 
    I think that I have borne as much as this- 
 Or else I dream- and for so long a time, 
 If I may measure time by yon slow light, 
 And this high dial, which my sorrow crowns- 
 So much- even so. 
          And yet I know not well, 
 For that the evil ones come here, and say, 
 “Fall down, O Simeon: thou hast suffered long 
 For ages and for ages!” then they prate 
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 Of penances I cannot have gone through, 
 Perplexing me with lies; and oft I fall, 
 Maybe for months, in such blind lethargies 
 That Heaven, and Earth, and Time are choked. (ll.91-102) 
 
Simeon’s opening statement here is tentative enough, but it is further undermined by his 
suggestion in the next line that his memory may in fact be a dream. He has no purchase 
on his mental processes, which operate beyond his control. His effort to silence his 
doubts about his memories and to resolve his internal conflict with a full-stopped “even 
so” collapses immediately as the next verse paragraph opens with another statement of 
uncertainty. Whether the “evil ones” who speak to Simeon are real people or 
hallucinations is largely irrelevant; what perplexes him is his own unreliable mind. The 
only possible solution for Simeon in the face of his chaotic thoughts seems to be to 
escape consciousness altogether. His fall into “blind lethargies” exposes the mind’s 
physical fragility, as both body and mind shut down under the pressure of the 
uncontrollable randomness of mental processes. 
 “St Simeon Stylites” is an exemplary dramatic monologue in the way that the 
form of the verse and the patterns of Simeon’s speech work, sometimes in unison and 
sometimes in juxtaposition, to convey the processes of his mind. At the start of this 
passage Simeon’s mental division is voiced in the qualification “or else” and is also 
encoded in the poem’s form, as the second line forces the reader to reappraise the 
meaning of the syntactical unit that forms the first line. Simeon’s expressions of self-
qualification show that his mind is changing from one moment to the next, but 
Tennyson’s positioning of them across line-breaks and in the gaps between verse 
paragraphs means that they also come to look like dramatically-scripted elements of a 
synchronous dialogue, internal reflections of the external dialogue that takes place 
between Simeon and the “evil ones”. Simeon’s mind is divided both across time and 
within each moment, and evidence of this thoroughgoing psychological division surfaces 
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throughout his monologue. Early in the poem he states that “my end draws nigh; / I hope 
my end draws nigh” (ll.35-6), and later he similarly declares that he has reached “the 
end! The end! / Surely the end!” (ll.198-9). In both cases the reader is forced to reassess 
the first line, which seems to finish on an assertion of fact, in light of the opening of the 
second. In the first example Simeon’s peremptory declaration is revealed to be nothing 
more than an expression of hope, while in the second his use of “surely”, which should 
reinforce the strength of his claim, instead strikes a desperate and pleading note that 
subverts the declamatory confidence of the preceding line. 
 It is significant that many of the moments in which Simeon reveals the divided 
and mutable state of his mind should centre on his desire for an ending. Robert Douglas-
Fairhurst has argued that doubt about the possibility of reaching a definite conclusion is 
written into the form of Tennyson’s blank verse poems, because “blank verse always 
threatens to sound incomplete until it is linked into a more extended stretch of narrative 
thought.”24 This sense of incompleteness, traceable throughout the blank verse of “St 
Simeon Stylites”, connects the poem to associationist accounts of the mind as a mutable 
succession of mental states. The psychological alterations embodied in the form of the 
poem are the constituent elements of Simeon’s mind, and he is powerless to bring them 
to a halt. Throughout the poem Simeon longs for an end to his physical suffering, and 
death, the only state in which this suffering will abate, is also the only state which can 
put an end to his mental turmoil. What happens after this ending, whether and how 
Simeon’s immortal soul will continue to exist independent of his body, is debatable. But 
the end is not possible while he continues to live and think, because his embodied mind 
is made up of a disputatious procession of thoughts which precludes psychological rest. 
 The speaker of “Tithon”, the unpublished 1833 draft of “Tithonus”, longs like 
Simeon for an end to his painful existence. Having been granted immortality, he now 
laments his earlier wish to live “beyond the goal of ordinance / Where all should pause, 
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as is most meet for all” (ll.22-3), the repetition of “all” indicating the strength of his 
conviction that the end offered by death is a necessary element of existence. Like “St 
Simeon Stylites”, this poem suggests that death is the only state in which the mind can 
“pause”, and that, in life, thought and feeling are inherently painful: 
    Ay me! ay me! what everlasting pain, 
Being immortal with a mortal heart, 
To live confronted with eternal youth: 
To look on what is beautiful nor know 
Enjoyment save through memory. (ll.11-15) 
 
In the original myth, Tithonus’s problem is specifically physical: his immortality is marred 
by his aging and decaying mortal body. Tennyson, by placing the speaker’s “everlasting 
pain” in his “mortal heart”, subtly shifts the focus of the story. Kirstie Blair has shown that 
Victorian writers were acutely aware of the dual nature of the heart, its “status as a 
physical organ with spiritual connotations”.25 Tennyson’s use of “heart” here makes 
Tithon’s predicament both physical and, if not spiritual, then psychological: it roots his 
suffering in his body while simultaneously hinting that his consciousness, his emotions, 
and his personality, inextricably bound up with his physical organs, are also fragile and 
mortal. This speaker’s unique corporeal circumstances, his existence in and as a body 
that is growing eternally weaker, make him far more prepared than Simeon to 
acknowledge the embodied nature of his mind. 
 Although Tithon’s pain is connected to his heart, Tennyson more usually locates 
his speakers’ anguish in their brains.26 The use of “heart” in “Tithon” was no doubt partly 
motivated by a desire to avoid the inclusion of a rhyme in the poem’s blank verse, but it 
is also apposite in the sense that, in these lines, the workings of the mind (and by 
extension of the brain too) offer some relief from pain in the form of the “enjoyment” that 
Tithon derives from his memories of his youth. Yet memory’s powers of consolation are 
limited; Tithon shares Arthur Hallam’s belief that the act of remembering is a source of 
both comfort and disquiet: 
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     Ay me! ay me! with what another heart, 
 By thy divine embraces circumfused, 
 Thy black curls burning into sunny rings, 
 With thy change changed, I felt this wondrous glow 
 That, gradually blooming, flushes all 
 Thy pale fair limbs: what time my mortal frame 
 Molten in thine immortal, I lay wooed. (ll.41-7) 
 
Like Hallam, Tithon presents his memories as having happened to a different person: his 
mortal self possessed “another heart”. Tithon is, of course, an extreme case, as his 
immortality heightens his awareness of the gap between his past and his present to an 
extraordinary pitch. Nonetheless, these lines suggest that the unsettling mutability of 
identity is an inevitable consequence of lived experience. Tithon’s comment to his lover 
Aurora, goddess of the dawn, that he “with thy change changed” suggests that emotional 
and psychological changes are as frequent and as irresistible as the dawn itself. This 
passage’s account of the sensual responsiveness of the body doubles as an invocation 
of the dawn, but the bodily changes that it delineates also reflect, and to some extent 
cause, the changes taking place within Tithon’s consciousness. The description of the 
“mortal frame / Molten” into another body, with its alliteration flowing over from one line 
into the next, captures both the physical basis of emotional experiences such as lust and 
grief and the power of those experiences to transform the mind. 
In “Tithonus”, the revised version of “Tithon” that Tennyson published in 1860, 
the speaker’s examination of memory goes further, suggesting that the mutability of the 
mind might lead to its total fragmentation: 
 Ay me! ay me! with what another heart 
 In days far-off, and with what other eyes 
 I used to watch- if I be he that watched- 
 The lucid outline forming round thee. (ll.50-53) 
 
This version of the passage heightens the sense of physical alteration: Tithonus’s past 
self had “other eyes” as well as “another heart”. Even more important for the passage’s 
psychological stance is the insertion of the qualifier “if I be he”. As Ricks points out, in 
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this phrase “a skill in miniature- a pronoun- effects something not miniature at all” (Ricks, 
Tennyson, p.123). Like the pronouns of “The Two Voices”, the pronouns of line 52 
describe mental division, although here it is division across time, suggesting that 
Hallam’s ideas about the divided and successive nature of the mind were prominent in 
Tennyson’s own mind when he revisited his past to revise “Tithon” after a gap of almost 
30 years. The bare simplicity of the phrase “if I be he” intensifies the impact of its claim 
that the physical and mental changes an individual undergoes over time might so alter 
identity that past and present selves become separate subjects requiring separate 
pronouns. Writing more than a decade before the publication of Walter Pater’s The 
Renaissance, Tennyson anticipates Pater’s argument, in the conclusion to his book, that 
the ephemeral nature of individual identity has its roots in the “perpetual motion” of 
physical processes: “the passage of the blood, the waste and repairing of the lenses of 
the eye, the modification of the tissues of the brain under every ray of light and sound”.27 
Characteristically, Tennyson’s speaker is less sanguine than Pater about possessing 
“other eyes”. Tithonus longs for death because it will bring to an end the preternaturally 
lengthy sequence of physical and psychological changes that have so fragmented his 
self-conception. 
In the revised conclusion of the poem, Tennyson employs another “skill in 
miniature”, this time in his use of prepositions, to suggest that death enables a restful 
resolution that is not feasible in life. Tithonus predicts to Aurora that, should he die, “thou 
wilt renew thy beauty morn by morn; / I earth in earth forget these empty courts” (ll.74-5). 
Cornelia Pearsall has argued that Tithonus sees his physical decay as a “dialectical 
process” not dissimilar to his lovemaking with Aurora, as both “involve for him the slow 
and staggered diffusion of the self into another entity, a submission of personal agency 
and bodily control”.28 However, there is a difference: unlike his relationship with Aurora, 
Tithonus’s absorption into the earth is not a process of ongoing change. It has a definite 
  21 
terminal point, a fact demonstrated by the prepositions used in these lines. The “by” of 
“morn by morn” confirms that Aurora will continue her daily transformations ad infinitum, 
while the “in” of “earth in earth” conveys a sense of a fixed consummation in death that 
Tithonus cannot find in the dynamic mental and physical processes that constitute life. 
His willingness to accept the embodied nature of his mind allows him to imagine a more 
certain end than Simeon’s and to hope that a physical death, without the possibility of an 
afterlife, will grant him relief from the hardship of unstoppable thought and feeling. 
“Ulysses”, written around the same time as “Tithon” and “St Simeon Stylites”, 
differs from those poems in being voiced by a speaker who vehemently refutes the 
desirability of coming to an end: “How dull it is to pause, to make an end, / To rust 
unburnished, not to shine in use!” (ll.22-3). Like Tithon, Ulysses imbues the word “pause” 
with a sense of finality, as if even a moment of stillness might result in a permanent and 
irreversible ending. Ulysses’s conviction that if he is not moving then he is as good as 
dead is evident from the opening lines of the poem: “It little profits that an idle king, / By 
this still hearth, among these barren crags” (ll.1-2). The prepositions “by” and “among” 
insistently trap Ulysses in a specific location, and the list of adjectives that he resentfully 
recites- “idle”, “still”, “barren”- shows that his dissatisfaction with life stems precisely from 
his inactivity. 
 Despite this difference in attitude, Ulysses shares with Tithon and Simeon the 
belief that change constitutes life and that fixity and resolution are equivalent to death. 
His restlessness is typically read as physical or political frustration, but it can also be 
seen in psychological terms. As the speaker of a dramatic monologue, Ulysses is literally 
speaking his mind; for all his talk of moving on, the action of the poem and the changes 
that are described within it and that take place over its course are psychological rather 
than physical. The poem presents an empiricist account of psychology in which Ulysses, 
like Tithon and Simeon, implicitly recognises that the experiences which he has 
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undergone have shaped and altered his identity. Unlike the other two monologists, 
however, Ulysses, in his concluding address to the mariners, articulates his appetite for 
new experiences and new changes that will prolong his existence: 
 Though much is taken, much abides; and though 
 We are not now that strength which in old days 
 Moved earth and heaven; that which we are, we are; 
 One equal temper of heroic hearts, 
 Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will 
 To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield. (ll.65-70) 
 
Although Ulysses insists that “much abides”, the emphasis of these lines is on the 
transient over the abiding. Ulysses’s mind and body have been transformed over time; 
the dual nature of the change is again signified by Tennyson’s reference to the heart. 
These transformations have left Ulysses physically “weak” and irrevocably changed: like 
Tithon, although obviously to a lesser extent, he is not the man he used to be. His 
assertion “that which we are, we are” is an attempt to construct a fixed (collective) 
identity for himself and his mariners, but its flat tautological repetition offers scant 
consolation for what has been “taken”, for the absence of what “we are not now”. 
 The impossibility of bridging the gap between present and past selves casts 
doubt on Ulysses’s seemingly triumphant celebration of will in the final lines by 
suggesting that however “strong in will” he may be, he is powerless in the face of “time 
and fate”. The strength of Ulysses’s will is itself called into question through the 
awkwardly irresolute tone introduced into this passage by “though” and “but”; his 
frequent qualification of his own statements creates the impression of a divided mind 
that cannot will itself into decisiveness. Even the assertion of will in the final line, which 
seems so unambiguous, is rhythmically and syntactically disrupted by the insertion of the 
negative near its end and is further undermined by the conclusive emphasis placed on 
the word “yield”. The critic Goldwin Smith, writing about “Ulysses” in 1855, suggested 
that the poem’s speaker “intends to roam, but stands for ever a listless and melancholy 
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figure on the shore.”29 His ultimate fate is a matter of conjecture, but the poem’s final 
lines offer no assurance that he has the capacity to convert the dictates of the will into 
action. The dominion over the mind that the speaker of “The Two Voices” invokes but 
struggles to enact is again checked in this monologue as the mind, tied to a frail body 
and pressed on by empirical conditions, undergoes changes that Ulysses is powerless to 
control. 
 The inescapable influence of experience and circumstance on the development 
and operation of the mind is affirmed by Ulysses’s famous self-definition: 
 I am a part of all that I have met; 
 Yet all experience is an arch wherethrough 
 Gleams that untravelled world, whose margin fades 
 For ever and for ever when I move. (ll.18-21) 
 
The last three lines encapsulate the frustrated idealism and reluctant empiricism that 
characterise much of Tennyson’s early poetry. The experiences that make up life appear 
to lead to the threshold of another world, numinous and metaphysical, that transcends 
the contingency of empirical existence. Yet this portal to transcendence is forever just 
out of reach; as Ulysses moves, as his mind changes as a result of his changing 
experiences, so the “untravelled world” shifts and recedes away from him. However far 
he travels, he cannot escape the physical world of experience that shapes his 
psychology. 
 The ambiguity of the statement “I am a part of all that I have met” leaves the 
precise nature of the relationship between Ulysses’s mind and the empirical world open 
to debate. This line can be read as an assertion on Ulysses’s part that he has left his 
mark on all that he has met; as a résumé of what Alan Sinfield calls “an imperialism of 
the imagination”.30 However, this reading of the line, as a confident proclamation of the 
power of personal agency, does not sit well with the ambivalence about the will and the 
emphasis on the intractability of empirical conditions that are traceable throughout the 
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monologue. While the wording of the statement allows that Ulysses has exerted an 
influence on all that he has met, it also reciprocally suggests that his psychology is 
inseparable from the experiences and circumstances that have influenced it. This 
empiricist stance implies that, without experience, the mind would be empty and 
personal identity an abstraction. Such an empiricist reading can be pursued further: if 
Ulysses’s “all that I have met” is taken to mean the whole mass of empirical conditions 
that have touched him throughout his life, then his psychology becomes just one facet or 
even offshoot of the circumstances that have produced, among other things, his mind. 
This last reading was the one favoured by George Henry Lewes. In the final 
volume of his psychological treatise Problems of Life and Mind, published in 1879, 
Lewes quotes Ulysses’s “I am a part of all that I have met” to support his view that 
psychology is determined by environmental conditions. After quoting the line, Lewes 
proceeds to comment that “we may say with equal truth, though not with equal rhythm, ‘I 
am the product of all that I have felt’”, incorporating Tennyson’s poetry into his empiricist 
argument that the mind is constantly “altered” and “modified” by experience, particularly 
physiological experience.31 The fact that Lewes, a physiological psychologist working in 
the associationist tradition, turned to “Ulysses” to find support for his theories shows that 
Tennyson’s contemporaries could identify physiological and empiricist postures in his 
descriptions of the mind if they were looking for them. But the readings of Tennyson 
made by Lewes and Spencer were not simply tendentious; physiological concepts are 
genuinely present in the account of the mind put forward in the poet’s early writing, 
despite his intense ambivalence about the implications of such concepts. While 
Tennyson may have hoped to believe in the existence of a sovereign will and an 
immaterial soul, his representations of embodied psychology in the poems of 1833 
suggest that he was equally drawn to another possibility: that personal identity is the 
product of an unruly, contingent, material mind. 
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